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Abstract
The new Basel III regulations are likely to make long-term financing more expensive, which
will affect the financing of capital-intensive renewable energy technologies, because they
typically rely on long-term financing. In addition, the capital and liquidity requirements of
Basel III are likely to limit the amount of capital available for renewable energy financing
from banks in the future. Together, these are threats to renewable energy deployment
because limited financing may prevent the financing of some projects and because more
expensive loans are likely to make a number of projects uninteresting financially. A potential
solution is proposed here, which requires financing capital-intensive energy projects, pooling
these investments into a portfolio and selling down the portfolio in tranches to various types
of investors. The benefit of this solution for banks is that it will allow them to maintain the
financing of capital intensive renewable energy projects, while complying more easily with
Basel III.
1. Introduction
In response to the 2007 financial crisis, a new set of financial regulations will be implemented
as of 2015 to push banks away from risk. These regulations are known as Basel III. Given the
importance of banks in financing renewable energy, it matters to understand how banks will
be impacted by these new regulations, especially since these new rules may temper banks’
appetite for renewable energy financing in the future (Warren, 2011).
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Excluding large hydro, USD 244 billion were invested globally in renewable energy in 2012
(UNEP/BNEF, 2013). Although this number was down 12% compared to 2011, 2012 was
the second year with the highest investment level in renewable energy. Of the total amount,
USD 148.5 billion went into utility-scale project asset financing. This type of financing
can be divided in three categories; on-balance sheet financing by utilities and large energy
companies, bonds and non-recourse project finance. Of these three, on-balance sheet financ-
ing clearly dominates the market, whereas the importance of bonds remains limited. The
last category: non-recourse project finance accounted for nearly USD 46 billion globally
(UNEP/BNEF, 2013), or in other words, to nearly a third of all asset financing. Nearly 90%
of the total asset financing is dominated by wind and solar projects (UNEP/BNEF, 2013),
two capital-intensive technologies requiring long-term financing.
Non-recourse project finance means that a bank will lend money to a single purpose entity,
such as a wind farm, based solely on the revenues generated during the operation of the
asset owned by the entity. This type of financing has emerged as a solution for financing
large infrastructure projects, including renewable energy utility scale projects, which would
otherwise have been too expensive or speculative for a corporate to finance them using its
balance sheet (de Jager et al., 2011; Groobey et al., 2010). Project finance pertains to the
creation of a project company, which is a legal entity created with the purpose of fulfilling
a specific or temporary objective such as the construction and the operation of a single
power plant. In addition to moving liabilities off a corporate balance sheet, lenders have
limited or no recourse to the parent company in case of default of the project company, thus
limiting the parent company’s project risk. Non-recourse project finance is of particular
interest in this study, because this source of financing is likely to be impacted by the Basel
III regulations.
In this study, the emphasis is on the role of banks in providing long-term financing for capital-
intensive renewable energy generating technologies. In particular, the possible impact of the
Basel III regulations on banks’ willingness to invest in capital-intensive renewable energy
technologies via project finance will be investigated and an alternative approach for financing
renewable energy under Basel III will be proposed.
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This study is structured as follows; the characteristics of financing wind and solar compared
to financing natural gas are described in section 2. The Basel III regulations and their pos-
sible impact on banks’ willingness to finance capital-intensive renewable energy technologies
are discussed in section 3. An alternative financing approach, useful under Basel III is
suggested in section 4, followed by a practical example in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. Difference between lending to wind and to natural gas
The fundamental difference between a wind farm and a natural gas power plant lies in the
portion of the total costs due to upfront costs (see figure 1). In the case of a wind farm, the
investment costs make the quasi-totality of the levelized costs of electricity, whereas these
account for only a fifth of a natural gas power plant costs, the rest being mostly related to
fuel costs (Timilsina et al., 2012). Moreover, investment costs per MW of a typical natural
gas power plant will be roughly half those of a wind farm. The high level of capital intensity
and the comparatively high cost per unit of capacity installed, imply that the tenor of a
construction loan needs to be significantly longer (10-15 years) for a wind farm than for a
natural gas power plant (<10 years).
Fossil-based power plants require fuel in order to generate electricity, whereas renewable
technologies do not, with the exception of bio-energy. Consequently, working capital loans
may be necessary for a natural gas power plant to purchase fuel, when the need for such loan
in the case of a wind farm is limited. Future fossil-fuel prices are uncertain and depend on a
number of factors, including national environmental regulations, global supply and demand,
the emergence of substitutes1 and the cost of extracting the resource. Renewable electricity
generating technologies such as wind and solar power face no uncertainty in the future cost
of their primary resource, although fluctuations in wind patterns and solar irradiation levels
can affect the output of these technologies.
In addition, fossil-based power plants can rely on a long track record to prove that the risk of
technological failure is minimal. Track records are shorter for less mature technologies such
1For example, shale gas is a substitute to natural gas.
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as wind power and especially for solar power. This means that these intermittent electricity
generating technologies are more likely to suffer failures than more mature technologies,
which heightens the risk that the lender will not recover its investment.
Both renewable- and fossil-based technologies eventually feed electricity into the grid. How-
ever, the cost of renewable technologies such as wind or solar power is generally more ex-
pensive than the cost of conventional fossil-based power plants. In order to facilitate the
deployment of these technologies, over hundred countries have implemented some type of
policy instruments leading to preferential treatment (REN21, 2012). These policy instru-
ments include, among others, feed-in tariffs and tradable certificates which aims at making
renewable energy more attractive towards potential lenders. Of these policy instruments,
feed-in tariffs are the preferred instrument of lenders (Menanteau et al., 2003) because sales
of electricity are guaranteed at a given price for a set duration of time, thus suppressing a
category of risk.
The cost and loan profiles per megawatt of installed capacity for a particular natural gas
power plant and a particular wind farm are illustrated in figure 1. In order to create this
figure, a debt equity ratio of 70:302 is assumed as the funding mix of both technologies. The
70% is provided under the form of a construction loan. At the end of the construction period,
the construction loan is converted into a term loan, which is repaid within seven years in
the case of the natural gas power plant and fifteen years in the case of the wind farm. A
working capital loan equivalent to 10% of the total cost of the plant is made available to the
natural gas power station for the first six years of operation. This revolving loan can be used
by the natural gas power station to purchase its feedstock. Interests and discount rates are
left aside of this example and future natural gas prices are held constant for simplification
purposes.
In summary, capital intensive renewable energy projects have shorter proven track records,
higher capital costs and require long-term loans. However, their main advantage over tech-
nologies relying on fossil fuels is that there is no uncertainty in the future cost of a resource
2Construction loan of 70% and 30% being equity.
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Figure 1: Cost and loan profile per MW of installed capacity for a natural gas power plant and a wind farm.
and requirements for working capital are limited. The implication of this section is that
different energy technologies have different inherent characteristics. Therefore, two tech-
nologies may be impacted differently by new rules, thus providing ground for this study.
The capital intensity of some technologies makes them particularly sensitive to regulations
affecting the cost of borrowing and as this study will show, Basel III is likely to result in
higher borrowing costs.
3. Basel III accords and implications
Banks failed to absorb systemic trading and credit losses (BCBS, 2011) during the 2007-2009
financial crisis, due to an insufficient capital base. This situation led the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision to edit new and strengthened existing standards that banks will need
to comply with in the upcoming years. In an effort of promoting a more resilient banking
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sector, minimum requirements on the quantity of common shares and retained earnings in
relation to risk-weighted assets are imposed and two liquidity ratios will be introduced in
the years to come: the Liquidity Coverage Ratio and the Net Stable Funding Ratio. These
ratios address short-term and long-term financing issues respectively (BCBS, 2011).
3.1. Liquidity coverage ratio
The aim of the liquidity coverage ratio is to promote short-term resilience to potential
liquidity disruptions (BCBS, 2013). This ratio ensures that the stock of unencumbered high
quality assets that can be converted into cash is sufficient to cover the bank’s liquidity needs
for 30 calendar days under a predefined short-term stress scenario. The metric behind the
liquidity coverage ratio is reproduced below:
Stock of high quality liquid assets
Net cash outflows over a 30 days period
≥ 60% (1)
This ratio will become a minimum requirement from January 2015 onwards and it will be
increased by 10% annually until January 2019 (BCBS, 2013). Cash, central bank reserves
and high quality marketable securities which are assigned a 0% risk-weight under the Basel
II Standardized Approach for credit risk, are the principal high quality liquid assets. These
assets have the common advantage of being easily and immediately converted into cash in
short-term stress periods at little or no loss of value. Thus, these assets have the potential
to guarantee a bank’s liquidity needs in short-term stress periods.
Net cash outflows are cash outflows net of cash inflows over a 30-days period. Cash out-
flows are subject to run-off rates, while cash inflows are subject to hair-cut rates. Under
the liquidity coverage ratio, cash inflows are capped to 75% to ensure that banks retain a
minimum level of high quality liquid assets compared to their total net cash outflows.
For the bank, funding capital-intensive renewable energy projects might become less inter-
esting when the liquidity coverage ratio enters into force. First of all, holding such energy
assets will not help a bank to improve its stock of high quality liquid assets because capital
intensive renewable energy projects funded through project finance or special purpose vehi-
cles do not qualify as such. Second, this type of projects does not receive any preferential
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treatment. Under the stress scenario, a drawdown rate of 100% on the undrawn portion
of liquidity facilities to special purpose vehicle has to be used. Consequently, investing
in capital intensive renewable energy projects through project finance and special purpose
vehicles worsen the bank’s liquidity coverage ratio as long as liquidity facilities are made
available (e.g.: during the construction phase), simply because it strengthens the denomi-
nator, while the numerator remains untouched. Renewable energy financing will thus force
banks to hold a given quantity of high quality liquid assets on their balance-sheet. Holding
these assets comes at a cost (D’Olier-Lees, 2011) and therefore, the cost of lending money
is likely to increase in the future as a response to this ratio. Eventually, this increase in
cost will be passed onto the borrowers through an increase in interest rates (Lowder, 2012),
making financing via banks less attractive for capital intensive renewable energy project
owners. Capital intensive energy technologies will particularly suffer because of their need
for a comparatively large amount of capital prior to the commissioning of the plant.
Recent studies from the European Banking Authority and the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision found that banks are between EUR 1,000 bn and EUR 1,730 bn short of com-
plying with the full liquidity target (Winkler, 2012). In order to comply with the minimum
requirement, banks can either choose to increase their high quality liquid assets holdings,
scale back their business activities that are most vulnerable to a short-term liquidity shock
or prolong the terms of liabilities beyond the 30 days period (Winkler, 2012). The gradual
phase-in of the ratio decided in January 20133 will ease the burden of banks in meeting with
the target, although European banks will still have to build up a significant amount of cash
buffers to cope with their liquidity concerns, which are greater than in other parts of the
world (Jones, 2013).
Investigating these solutions from a renewable energy perspective indicates that if the de-
mand for high quality liquid assets increases, the amount of capital available for financing
renewable energy projects will be reduced since these do not qualify as high quality liquid
assets. Scaling back business activities would also contribute to the shrinkage of the capital
3In a former version, the liquidity coverage ratio was supposed to enter into force in full as of January
2015.
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available for capital-intensive renewable energy financing.
In summary, the liquidity coverage ratio is likely to reduce the amount of capital available for
financing renewable energy projects and might lead to higher interest rates. This obviously
is a threat against the development of capital intensive renewable energy via financing from
banks in the future.
3.2. Net stable funding ratio
The net stable funding ratio aims at limiting a bank’s reliance on short-term funding to
finance its operations (Winkler, 2012). Practically, the net stable funding ratio ensures that
the bank holds enough stable funding in relation to the liquidity risk profile of its assets
over a one-year horizon (BCBS, 2011). The net stable funding ratio will become a minimum
requirement in January 2018. The preliminary new liquidity ratio metric (BCBS, 2010) is
reproduced below:
Available amount of stable funding
Required amount of stable funding
> 100% (2)
A bank’s weighted capital, preferred stocks and liabilities with maturities of at least one year
are examples of funding deemed to be available and stable. The amount of stable funding
required depends on the characteristics of an asset and each asset will be assigned a required
stable funding factor, which is in proportion to the expected liquidity and availability of an
asset in a stressed environment. The less liquid and less available an asset is in a stressed
environment, the more stable funding is required. Energy technologies financed via project
finance have a required stable funding factor of 100%. This ratio ties up the capital to
match assets with a maturity of over a year with liabilities with a maturity of over a year as
well. It means that in order to finance a renewable energy project for over one year, a bank
will be requested to maintain stable funding for at least the same duration of time in order
to back the loan (Lowder, 2012; Watson, 2012). The cost of holding this amount of stable
funding in order to guarantee a sufficient level of liquidity over the period of one year in case
of operations related to renewable energy might become prohibitively expensive in the long-
term, which may imply that banks will want faster repayment (Carr, 2012). It is believed
8
by some (Eckhardt, 2012) that long-term capital loans will not exceed seven years in the
future, which falls short of the 10 to 15 years financing needed to support most renewable
energy projects. This duration of time is however sufficient for natural gas power plants.
Therefore, and similar to the case of the liquidity coverage ratio, the inherent characteristics
of capital intensive renewable energy technologies puts them at a disadvantage.
Perhaps as a result of Basel III, banks increasingly turned towards mini-perms to finance cap-
ital intensive renewable energy technologies until recently when they revert back to project
financing. Mini-perms are short-term lending facilities, which assume a partial repayment
of a debt over a limited period of time (5-7 years) after which refinancing needs to take
place. This need is triggered either by a steep increase in interest scheduled to take place at
maturity (soft mini-perm) or by the conditions that without refinancing before maturity, it
leads to default (hard mini-perm).
Overall, Basel III could tighten banks’ provision of long-term finance (Kaminker, 2012)
or result in increased interest rates compared to a Basel III-free situation. Either of these
changes are unlikely to deter investment in very profitable capital-intensive renewable energy
projects (e.g.: those that benefit from very favorable feed-in tariffs or that show a high debt
coverage ratio), although it will make them marginally less profitable. At the margin, some
projects might become unprofitable and will therefore not be financed. This will result
in less renewable energy capacity installed at the time when a large investment in these
technologies is needed in order for the European Union to reach its renewable energy target.
It is important to stress the marginal impact of Basel III, because changes in energy policies,
technological progress improving the competitiveness of a technology or a surge in fossil-fuel
prices all are example of shocks which have a potential to completely change the level of
investment of any specific energy technology.
4. Alternative financing approach
The emphasis in this section is on exploring a solution which would allow banks to keep
investing in renewable energy while oﬄoading their balance-sheet and thus not worsen their
liquidity coverage and net stable funding ratios.
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The solution proposed here is for banks to provide loan to renewable energy projects struc-
tured as project financing. Several loans could then be pooled to form a portfolio of renew-
able energy projects, which would be tranched in order to make it attractive to a variety of
investors in order to transfer the risk and the assets from a bank’s balance sheet to investors.
Such investors could include pension funds and socially responsible investors.
Pension funds, e.g.: the Norwegian Government Pension Fund, are looking for steady, infla-
tion adjusted income streams (Croce, 2011) and in this respect, investing in wind and solar
power is interesting as these will be in operation for over 20 years and as they will yield
steady returns over that time period. Yet, few pension funds have been significantly involved
in renewable energy financing so far, perhaps because of a lack of expertise or perhaps most
likely, because of a mismatch between risk and return (Croce, 2011) on renewable energy
investments and due to a lack of appropriate investment vehicles (Kaminker, 2012).
Taking this mismatch into account, a first tranch of a bank’s portfolio could be a bond-like
vehicle secured on a number of renewable energy projects, yielding an interesting return for
pension funds for a corresponding level of risk. Repayment terms would be contractually
set at issuance. This type of products is likely to be of interest to pension funds.
Socially responsible investors are investors who care about environmental issues. It seems
that the amount of money that banks could tap into if they were to offer a product allowing
socially responsible investors to invest into renewable energy is fairly large. For example,
Mosaic in the USA raised USD 3.8 million from crowd funding and the company is investing
this capital in solar energy projects with internal rate of return between 4 and 6%. The
World Bank has raised over USD 4 billion in Green Bonds since 2008. The maturity of
the bonds ranges from five to ten years with a yield from 0.375% to 10%4. Zouk Capital
created a fund worth EUR 230 million, which primarily invests in renewable energy projects
(UNEP/BNEF, 2013). A product, which may attract socially responsible investors is another
bond-like vehicle linked to the performance of the project, allowing private investors to
benefit from some of the government support towards renewable energy. This vehicle would
4High yields are valid for bonds labeled in currencies subject to high inflation rates.
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Total cost USD 25.8 mio.
Installed capacity 11.5 MW
Debt equity mix1 70/30
Debt interest rate1 6%
O&M costs1 1.2 US cent/kWh
Capacity factor1 36%
Feed-in tariff 6.65 US cent/kWh
Table 1: Data related to the Ardoch and Over Enoch wind farm. 1 estimated.
yield comparatively higher returns for a more than proportional risk compared to bonds for
pension funds.
5. Practical example
An example is proposed to illustrate how a project could be tranched and sold to different
groups of investors. The following practical example is based on the data available for the
Ardoch and Over Enoch wind farm planned to come online in October 2014. Each unit of
electricity generated by this wind farm will be remunerated at an inflation-adjusted rate of
6.65 US cent/kWh for the first 20 years of operation. This feed-in tariff is valuable since it
suppresses one category of risk, namely the uncertainty in future electricity prices. Conse-
quently, fluctuations in wind conditions become the main source of risk as wind fluctuations
will influence the quantity of electricity generated, hence the revenues. Key data used for
this example is summarized in table 1.
With a 70:30 debt equity mix, this 11.5 MW wind farm is able to borrow USD 18.6 millions.
In addition to this loan, the deal includes working capital and debt coverage reserves facili-
ties. These are omitted in this example. The conditions of the debt include repayment over
15 years and an interest rate of 6%. Revenues can be estimated by combining the installed
capacity, the capacity factor and the feed-in tariff. These revenues are needed to service the
debt, cover the operation and maintenance costs of the wind farm and generate a return
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for the plant owner (see figure 2). If the assumptions are correct5, the owner of the plant
will achieve a return over investment (ROI) of approximately 75%, which is equivalent to
an annualized ROI of 2.7%.
Figure 2: Revenue allocation for the Ardoch and Over Enoch wind farm over its economic plant life.
Financing this type of project under Basel III means that the conditions faced by the bor-
rower may worsen. In this special example, an extra 0.5% in the interest rate would make
the project uninteresting financially as the cash flow would not suffice to service the debt
and cover the O&M costs.
As suggested earlier, the bank may choose to provide a construction loan to the wind farm
developer and once the wind farm is commissioned, sell-down the debt instead of keeping
the asset on its balance-sheet. If this debt is to be sold to private investors, it is useful to
know what type of yield investors are expecting for a given risk.
Figure 3 shows an estimate of the relationship between risk and yield in Norway. This figure
shows seven data points. Each data point represents the average of the standard deviation
over the last three years of all Nordea funds falling under one of the seven categories of risk
as defined by Nordea, compared to the average annualized yield over the same period of
5Inflation is omitted and since the feed-in tariff is inflation-adjusted, whereas the rate of interest is stable,
inflation will improve the ROI of the plant owner and clearly improve the debt coverage ratio of the plant.
12
time as of September 2013. The trend is a forced linear fit, which is used to estimate what
type of yield an investor wants for a given risk.
Figure 3: Cost and loan profile per MW of installed capacity for a natural gas power plant and a wind farm.
This example assumes that revenues will be stable over time, which implicitly means that
variations in annual mean wind speed are ignored. In practice, the annual mean wind speed
at a location is likely to vary over the years, which will affect the number of full load hours
of a wind farm and hence, the annual revenues of the wind farm. The wind farm used in
this example has an estimated capacity factor of 36%, which corresponds to 3,150 full load
hours. In average, the standard deviation in year to year mean wind speed for such a wind
farm amounts to 200 full-load hours per year (Green, 2012), which corresponds to a standard
deviation of 6%.
Using the linear relationship between risk and yield, private investors would require a yield
of 5.6% for investing in the wind farm, provided that all the risk is related to wind variation.
Yet, selling down the debt to private investors seems to make sense in this case. However,
the base of investors may be limited; in which case reaching out to several categories of
investors becomes valuable. For example, if at least 2,750 full load hours are “guaranteed”6,
a first tranch of the debt, perhaps up to 60% of the debt could be sold down to interested
6Two standard deviations from 3,150 full load hours indicates that 2,750 full load hours can be guaranteed
in 95% of the years.
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pension funds. Standard deviation of wind conditions on this tranch is low and yield needs
not be huge (in the range of 4%). The rest could be sold to private investors, which means
that 40% of the debt would need to bare most of the risk related to variations in annual
mean wind speed. For this second tranch of the debt, the risk would amount to:
200/(0.4·3150) ≈ 16%
and the corresponding yield is 7.8%. One of the benefits for a private investor to hold
such type of asset is that the yield depends on wind, which is uncorrelated to the economic
situation, thus allowing an investor to diversify his portfolio. For the project, debt could
consequently be obtained at a rate of:
(0.6 · 0.04) + (0.4 · 0.078) = 5.5%
to which other risks (i.e.: construction, operational and policy risks) and fees perceived by
the bank managing the project need to be added. Now, pooling together the debt provided
to a number of wind farms and solar projects could reduce the risk related to wind variations
and other categories significantly, as well as increase the liquidity of the asset.
The example provided here is intentionally simplistic since only one category of risk is
considered. Yet, it shows that this type of approach should be implementable in practice.
The benefit of this approach is that a parent company can still oﬄoad the risk associated to
a wind farm or a solar power plant similarly to a case where a project is financed via project
finance. Banks benefit from this approach because it will allow them to comply more easily
with the new Basel III requirements7. Private investors benefit from this approach because
they get access to a type of asset which will greatly help them diversify their portfolio.
A threat to this type of approach is whether pension funds will be subject to Solvency II
like regulations, which might be the case in the future, although how the regulations will be
shaped is uncertain. Another challenge would be to generate a bond that is large enough to
reach an institutional investment grade level. Finally, ownership of the underlying asset in
case of default would obviously need to be clarified.
7In terms of the LCR, the NFSR and the new leverage ratio, which sets a limit to the amount of assets
and commitments a bank can possess with respect to its Tier 1 capital.
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6. Conclusion
Basel III is likely to reduce banks’ appetite for renewable energy financing via project finance.
This result is due to two distinct aspects. First, long-term financing is likely to become more
expensive because of the newly introduced Liquidity coverage ratio and Net stable funding
ratio. Second, new capital requirements mean that banks will have less funds to invest in
illiquid assets. In particular, Basel III is likely to hit capital-intensive renewable energy
technologies harder than other technologies, because of their inherent characteristics.
With Basel III, banks will need to be creative to find ways to finance capital-intensive
renewable energy technologies. A possible approach is suggested in this study, where a bank
would provide loans to capital-intensive renewable energy projects, pool these loans, tranch
them and sell them down to various groups of investors. This approach would have the
benefit of taking the risk off a bank’s balance sheet and thus facilitate a bank’s compliance
with Basel III, while allowing the bank to keep investing in capital-intensive renewable
energy technologies.
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